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Abstract
Recent researches show that millimeter wave (mmWave) communications can offer orders of magnitude
increases in the cellular capacity. However, the secrecy performance of a mmWave cellular network has not
been investigated so far. Leveraging the new path-loss and blockage models for mmWave channels, which
are significantly different from the conventional microwave channel, this paper comprehensively studies the
network-wide physical layer security performance of the downlink transmission in a mmWave cellular network
under a stochastic geometry framework. We first study the secure connectivity probability and the average
number of perfect communication links per unit area in a noise-limited mmWave network for both non-colluding
and colluding eavesdroppers scenarios, respectively. Then, we evaluate the effect of the artificial noise (AN) on
the secrecy performance, and derive the analysis result of average number of perfect communication links per
unit area in an interference-limited mmWave network. Numerical results are demonstrated to show the network-
wide secrecy performance, and provide interesting insights into how the secrecy performance is influenced by
various network parameters: antenna array pattern, base station (BS) intensity, and AN power allocation, etc.
Index Terms
Millimeter wave network, physical layer security, stochastic geometry, Poisson point process, artificial
noise
I. INTRODUCTION
Within the next 20 years, wireless data traffic can be anticipated to skyrocket 10,000 folds, spurred
by the popularity of various intelligent devices. Conventional communication means are difficult to
meet such incredible increase in the wireless data traffic. Millimeter wave cellular communication has
received an increasing attention due to the large available bandwidth at millimeter wave frequencies [1].
Recent field measurements have shown the huge advantages of mmWave networks, compared with the
conventional microwave network in band below 6 GHz [1], [2], [3]. Due to the small wavelength, the
mmWave cellular network is different from the conventional microwave network in the following ways:
large number of antennas, sensitivity to blockages, and variable propagation laws, etc [4]. Recently,
based on the real-world measurements in [3], spatial statistical models of the mmWave channel have
been built in [5], which reveal the different path loss characteristics of the line-of-sight (LOS) and
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2non-line-of-sight (NLOS) links. Under the new channel model, the network-wide performance of a
mmWave cellular has attracted increasing attentions, and many works have investigated the SINR
distribution, coverage, and average ergodic rate of the network under a stochastic geometry framework
[6]-[11]. They show that the mmWave network has a great potential to provide tremendous data traffic
increase.
All the above works have focused on the rate/reliability performance of the mmWave network,
however, its secrecy performance has not been investigated so far. Given the ubiquitousness of wire-
less connections, an enormous amount of sensitive and confidential information, e.g. financial data,
electronic cryptography, and private video, have been transmitted via wireless channels. Thus, providing
a secure service is one of the top priorities in the design and implementation of mmWave networks
[12]. In this paper, we investigate the physical layer security performance of mmWave networks by
adopting the stochastic geometry framework.
A. Background
Physical layer security has been identified as a promising strategy that exploits randomness of
wireless medium to protect the confidential information from wiretapping [13], [14]. Recently, multiple-
antenna technology becomes a powerful tool for enhancing the physical layer security in random
networks [15]. With the degrees of freedom provided by multiple antennas, the transmitter can adjust its
antenna steering orientation to exploit the maximum directivity gain while reducing the signal leakage
to eavesdroppers [16]-[17], or radiate the artificial nosie (AN) for jamming potential eavesdroppers
[18]-[19]. The secure connectivity, secrecy rate and secrecy outage with multi-antenna transmissions
in wireless random networks have been studied in [16]-[17], respectively. The impact of AN on the
security of random networks has been studied in [19].
However, all of the above works focus on conventional microwave networks, and the obtained results
can not be applied to mmWave networks directly, due to the distinctive features of mmWave channel
characteristics. For example, mmWave signals are more sensitive to blockage effects, and the fading
statistical characteristics of the LOS link and NLOS link are totally different [3]. For characterizing the
blockage effects of mmWave signals, different mmWave channel models have been proposed in [4]-
[11]. In [6], an exponential blockage model has been proposed, and such model has been approximated
3as a LOS ball based blockage model for the coverage analysis in [4], [7]. In [8], the authors adopted
the exponential blockage model to perform the coverage and capacity analysis for mmWave ad hoc
networks. In [10], the authors proposed a ball based blockage model which is validated by using
field measurements in New York and Chicago. Taking the outage state emerging in the mmWave
communication into consideration, in [11], the authors have proposed a two-ball approximate blockage
model for the analysis of the coverage and average rate of the multi-tier mmWave cellular network.
Under these new characteristics of mmWave channels, the secrecy performance of a mmWave
cellular network will be significantly different from the conventional microwave network, which should
be re-evaluated. The efficiency of traditional physical layer security techniques should be re-checked
as well. Recently, the secrecy performance of a point-to-point mmWave communication has been
studied in [25], which has shown that mmWave systems can enable significant secrecy improvement
compared with conventional microwave systems. However, the network-wide secrecy performance of
the mmWave cellular communication is still unknown, which motivates our work.
B. Contribution
In this paper, using the stochastic geometry framework and the blockage model proposed in [10], we
proposed a systematic secrecy performance analysis approach for the mmWave cellular communication,
by modeling the random locations of the BSs and eavesdroppers as two independent homogeneous
Possion point processes (PPPs). Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1) Secrecy performance analysis of noise-limited mmWave cellular networks. We characterize
the secrecy performance of a noise-limited mmWave cellular network that is applicable to
medium/sparse network deployments, where each BS only adopts the directional beamforming
to transmit the confidential information. Considering two cases: the non-colluding eavesdropper
case and the colluding eavesdroppers case, we derive the analysis result of the secure connectivity
probability and the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the received SNR at the typical
receiver and eavesdropper, respectively. The secure connectivity probability facilitates the eval-
uation of the probability of the existence of secure connections from a typical transmitter to its
intended receiver. With the CDF of the received SNR at the typical receiver and eavesdropper,
we can characterize the average number of perfect communication links per unit area statistically
4in the random network. We show that the high gain narrow beam antenna is very important for
enhancing the secrecy performance of mmWave networks.
2) Secrecy performance analysis of AN assisted mmWave cellular networks. When AN is
transmitted concurrently with the confidential information for interfering potential eavesdroppers,
the AN radiation would increase the network interference. Thus, taking the network interference
into consideration, we characterize the CDF of received SINRs at the intended receiver and non-
colluding eavesdroppers. The secrecy probability and average number of perfect communication
links per unit area for the AN assisted transmission have also been derived. The optimal power
allocation between the AN and confidential signal is shown to depend on the array pattern and
the intensity of eavesdroppers.
C. Paper Organization and Notations
In Section II, the system model and mmWave channel characteristics are introduced. In Section III,
considering the noise-limited mmWave cellular communication, we characterize the secure connectivity
probability and average number of perfect communication links per unit area. In Section IV, taking the
inter-cell interference into consideration, we characterize the average number of perfect communication
links per unit area of the AN-assisted mmWave communication. Numerical results are provided in
Section V and the paper is concluded in Section VI.
Notation: x ∼ gamma(k,m) denotes the gamma-distributed random variable with shape k and
scale m, γ(x, y) is the lower incomplete gamma function [30, 8.350.1], Γ(x) is the gamma function
[30, eq. (8.310)], and Γ(a, x) is the upper incomplete function [30, 8.350.2]. b(o,D) denotes the
ball whose center is origin and radius is D. The factorial of a non-negative integer n is denoted by
n!, x ∼ CN (Λ,∆) denotes the circular symmetric complex Gaussian vector with mean vector Λ
and covariance matrix ∆,
(
n
k
)
= n!
(n−k)!k!
. LX(s) denotes the Laplace transform of X , i.e., E
(
e−sX
)
.
2F1(α, β; γ, z) is the Gauss hypergeometric function [30, eq. (9.100)].
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider the downlink secure communication in the mmWave cellular network, where multiple
spatially distributed BSs transmit the confidential information to authorized users in the presence of
multiple malicious eavesdroppers. In the following subsections, we first introduce the system model
5and channel characteristics adopted in this paper, which have been validated in [4], [8], [10]. With such
models, we give some important results on probability theory which will be used in the performance
analysis. The secrecy performance metrics adopted are given in Section II-G.
A. BS and eavesdropper layout
The locations of the BSs are modeled by a homogeneous PPP ΦB of intensity λB . Using PPP
for modeling the irregular BSs locations has been shown to be an accurate and tractable approach
for characterizing the downlink performance of the cellular network [28]. Just as [19]-[20], the
locations of multiple eavesdroppers are modeled as an independent homogeneous PPP, ΦE , of intensity
λE. Such random PPP model is well motivated by the random and unpredictable eavesdroppers’
locations. Furthermore, just as [19], [21]-[23], we consider the worst-case scenario by facilitating
the eavesdroppers’ multi-user decodability, i.e., eavesdroppers can perform successive interference
cancellation [24] to eliminate the interference due to the information signals from other interfering
BSs. The total transmit power of each BS is Pt.
B. Directional beamforming
For compensating the significant path-loss at mmWave frequencies, highly directional beamforming
antenna arrays are deployed at BSs to perform the directional beamforming. For mathematical tractabil-
ity and similar to [4], [8], [10], [11], the antenna pattern is approximated by a sectored antenna model
in [26]. In particular,
Gb(θ) =
{
Ms, if |θ| ≤ θb
ms, Otherwise,
(1)
where θb is the beam width of the main lobe, Ms and ms are the array gains of main and sidelobes,
respectively. In this paper, we assume that each BS can get the perfect CSI estimation, including angles
of arrivals and fading, and then, they can adjust their antenna steering orientation array for adjusting the
boresight direction of antennas to their intended receivers and maximizing the directivity gains. In the
following, we denote the boresight direction of the antennas as 0o. Therefore, the directivity gain for the
intended link is Ms. For each interfering link, the angle θ is independently and uniformly distributed
in [−π, π], which results in a random directivity gain Gb(θ). For simplifying the performance analysis,
6just as [10], [25], the authorized users and malicious eavesdroppers are both assumed to be equipped
with a single omnidirectional antenna in this paper. 1
C. Small-scale fading
Just as [4], [8], we assume that the small-scale fading of each link follows independent Nakagami
fading, and the Nakagami fading parameter of the LOS (NLOS) link is NL (NN ). For simplicity, NL
and NN are both assumed to be positive integers. In the following, the small-scale channel gain from
the BS at x ∈ R2 to the authorized user (eavesdropper) at y ∈ R2 is expressed as hxy (gxy).
D. Blockage Model
The blockage model proposed in [10] is adopted, which can be regarded as an approximation of
the statistical blockage model in [5, eq. (8)], [11], and incorporates the LOS ball model proposed in
[4], [7] as a special case. As shown by [9], [10], the blockage model proposed in [10] is simple yet
flexible enough to capture blockage statistics, coverage and rate trends in mmWave cellular networks.
In particular, defining qL(r) as the probability that a link of length r is LOS,
qL(r) =
{
C, if r ≤ D,
0, Otherwise, (2)
for some 0 ≤ C ≤ 1. The parameter C can be interpreted as the average LOS area in the spherical
region around a typical user. The empirical (C,D) for Chicago and Manhattan are (0.081, 250) and
(0.117, 200), respectively [10], which would be adopted in the simulation results. With such blockage
model, the BS process in b(o,D) can be divided into two independent PPPs: the LOS BS process ΦL
with intensity CλB and NLOS BS process with intensity (1− C)λB [28, Proposition 1.3.5]. Outside
b(o,D), only the NLOS BS process exists with intensity λB. We denote the whole NLOS BS process
as ΦN .
E. Path loss model
Just as [4], [10], different path loss laws are applied to LOS and NLOS links. In particular, given
a link from x ∈ R2 to y ∈ R2, its path loss L(x, y) can be calculated by
L(x, y) =
{
CL||x− y||
−αL, if link x→ y is LOS link,
CN ||x− y||−αN , if link x→ y is NLOS link,
(3)
1This assumption is just for simplifying the performance analysis. However, the obtained analysis methods can be extended to the
multiple antennas case directly by modeling the array pattern at authorized users and malicious eavesdroppers in a similar way as (1).
7where αL and αN are the LOS and NLOS path loss exponents, and CL , 10−
βL
10 and CN , 10−
βN
10
can be regarded as the path-loss intercepts of LOS and NLOS links at the reference distance. Typical
αj and βj for j ∈ {L,N} are defined in [5, Table I]. For exmple, for 28 GHz bands, βL = 61.4,
αL = 2, and βN = 72, αN = 2.92. From the measured values of Cj and αj , j ∈ {L,N} in [5, Table
I], we know that it satisfies CL > CN and αL < αN .
F. User association
For maximizing the receiving quality of authorized users [4], [10], one authorized user is assumed
to be associated with the BS offering the lowest path loss to him, since the network considered
is homogeneous. Thus, for the typical authorized user at origin, its serving BS is located at x∗ ,
argmaxx∈ΦB L(x, o). Denoting the distance from the typical authorized user to the nearest BS in Φj
as d∗j for j = {L,N}, the following Lemma 1 provides their probability distribution functions (pdf),
and the obtained statistics hold for a generic authorized user, due to Slivnyak’s theorem [28].
Lemma 1: Given the typical authorized user observes at least one LOS BS, the pdf of d∗L is
fd∗
L
(r) =
2πCλBrexp(−πCλBr2)
1− exp(−πCλBD2)
, for r ∈ [0, D] . (4)
On the other hand, the pdf of d∗N is given by
fd∗
N
(r) = 2π(1− C)λBre
−pi(1−C)λBr
2
I (r ≤ D) + 2λBπre
−λBpi(r2−D2)e−pi(1−C)λBD
2
I (r > D) , (5)
where I (.) is the indicator function.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.
Then, the following lemma gives the probability that the typical authorized user is associated with a
LOS or NLOS BS.
Lemma 2: The probability that the authorized user is associated with a NLOS BS, AN , is given by
AN =
∫ µ
0
(
e
−piCλB
(
CL
CN
) 2
αL x
2αN
αL
− e−piCλBD
2
)
2π(1− C)λBxe
−pi(1−C)λBx
2
dx+ e−piCλBD
2
, (6)
where µ ,
(
CL
CN
)− 1
αN D
αL
αN . The probability that the typical authorized user is associated with a LOS
BS is given by AL = 1− AN .
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.
8With the smallest path loss association rule, the typical authorized user would be associated with
the nearest LOS BS in ΦL or the nearest NLOS BS in ΦN . The following lemma gives the pdf of the
distance between the typical authorized user and its serving BS in Φj , i.e., rj , ∀j ∈ {L,N}.
Lemma 3: On the condition that the serving BS is in ΦL, the pdf of the distance from the typical
authorized user to its serving BS in ΦL is
frL(r) =
exp
(
−(1 − C)λBπ
(
CN
CL
) 2
αN r
2αL
αN
)
2πCλBrexp (−CλBπr2)
AL
, r ∈ [0, D] . (7)
On the condition that the serving BS is in ΦN , the pdf of the distance from the typical authorized
user to its serving BS in ΦN is
frN (r) =
2πλBrexp (−πλBr2) ((1− C) exp (πCλB (r2 −D2)) I (r ≤ D) + I (r ≥ D))
AN
+
2π(1− C)λBre−(1−C)λBpir
2
(
e
−CλBpi
(
CL
CN
) 2
αL r
2αN
αL
− e−CλBpiD
2
)
AN
I
(
r ≤
(
CN
CL
) 1
αN
D
αL
αN
)
. (8)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix C.
G. Secrecy Performance Metric
In this paper, we assume that the channels are all quasi-static fading channels. The legitimate
receivers and eavesdroppers can obtain their own CSI, but mmWave BSs do not know the instantaneous
CSI of eavesdroppers. For protecting the confidential information from wiretapping, each BS encodes
the confidential data by the Wyner code [13]. Then two code rates namely, the rate of the transmitted
codewords Rb, and the rate of the confidential information Rs should be determined before the data
transmission, and Rb − Rs is the cost for securing the confidential information. The details of the
code construction can be found in [13], [27]. In this paper, just as [19], [20], [27], we adopt the fixed
rate transmission, where Rb and Rs are fixed during the information transmission. For the secrecy
transmission over quasi-static fading channels, the perfect secrecy can not always be guaranteed.
Therefore, as indicated in [16], [20], [27], an outage-based secrecy performance metric is more suitable.
Therefore, we analyze the secrecy performance of the mmWave communication by considering both
the secure connectivity probability and average number of perfect communication links per unit area.
91) Secure connectivity probability [16]. Secure connectivity probability introduced in [16], is defined
as the probability that the secrecy rate is nonnegative. Using the secure connectivity probability,
we aim to statistically characterize the existence of secure connection between any randomly
chosen BS and its intended authorized user in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers.
2) Average number of perfect communication links per unit area [20].When Rb and Rs are given,
we define the links that have perfect connection and secrecy as perfect communication links.
Then, the mathematical definition of the average number of perfect communication links per
unit area is given as follows.
• Connection Probability. When Rb is below the capacity of legitimate links, authorized users
can decode signals with an arbitrary small error, and thus perfect connection can be assured.
Otherwise, connection outage would occur. The connection probability is denoted as pcon.
• Secrecy Probability. When the wiretapping capacity of eavesdroppers is below the rate
redundancy Re , Rb−Rs, there will be no information leakage to potential eavesdroppers,
and thus perfect secrecy of the link can be assured [13]. Otherwise, secrecy outage would
occur. The secrecy probability is denoted as psec.
Following [20, eq. (29)], the average number of perfect communication links per unit area is
Np = λBpconpsec. (9)
Remark 1: With the given Rb and Rs, the average achievable secrecy throughput per unit area ω
can be calculated by ω = NpRs.
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE OF THE NOISE-LIMITED MILLIMETER WAVE COMMUNICATION
In this section, we evaluate the secrecy performance of the direct transmission for the noise-limited
mmWave communication. As pointed out by [3], [5], [10], [11], highly directional transmissions
used in mmWave systems combined with short cell radius results in links that are noise-dominated,
especially for densely blocked settings (e.g., urban settings) and medium/sparse network deployments
[10], [11]. This distinguishes from current dense cellular deployments where links are overwhelmingly
interference-dominated. Therefore, just as [10], [11], we first study the secrecy performance of the
noise-limited mmWave communication without considering the effect of inter-cell interference. The
received SNR by the typical authorized user at origin and the eavesdropper at z with respect to the
10
serving BS can be expressed as SNRU = PtMsL(x
∗,o)hx∗o
N0
and SNREz =
PtGb(θ)L(x
∗,z)gx∗z
N0
. N0 is the
noise power in the form of N0 = 10
N0(dB)
10 , where N0(dB) = −174 + 10log10(BW) +FdB , BW is the
transmission bandwidth and FdB is the noise figure [11]. With the array pattern in (1), Gb(θ) seen by
the eavesdropper is a Bernoulli random variable whose probability mass function (PMF) is given by
Gb(θ) =
{
Ms, PrGb(Ms) , Pr (Gb(θ) = Ms) =
θb
180
,
ms, PrGb(ms) , Pr (Gb(θ) = ms) =
180−θb
180
.
(10)
A. Non-colluding Eavesdroppers
In this subsection, assuming that the random distributed eavesdroppers are non-colluding, we
evaluate the secrecy performance of the mmWave cellular network.
1) Secure Connectivity Probability: We first study the secure connectivity probability, τn, of the
mmWave communication in the presence of multiple non-colluding eavesdroppers. A secure connection
is possible if the condition MsL(x
∗,o)hx∗o
maxz∈ΦE Gb(θ)L(x
∗,z)gx∗z
≥ 1 holds [16], and the secure connectivity prob-
ability can be calculated by τn = Pr
(
MsL(x∗,o)hx∗o
maxz∈ΦE Gb(θ)L(x
∗,z)gx∗z
≥ 1
)
. We can see that the wiretapping
capability of multiple eavesdroppers is determined by the path loss process Gb(θ)L(x∗, z)gx∗z. Thus,
for facilitating the performance evaluation, the following process is introduced.
Definition 1: The path loss process with fading (PLPF), denoted as NE, is the point process on
R
+ mapped from ΦE , where NE ,
{
ςz =
1
Gb(θ)gxzL(x,z)
, z ∈ ΦE
}
and x denotes the location of the
wiretapped BS. We sort the elements of NE in ascending order and denote the sorted elements of NE
as {ξi, i = 1, . . .}. The index is introduced such that ξi ≤ ξj for ∀i < j.
Note that NE involves both the impact of small fading and spatial distribution of eavesdroppers,
which is an ordered process. Consequently, NE determines the wiretapping capability of eavesdropper.
We then have the following lemma.
Lemma 4: The PLPF NE is an one-dimensional nonhomogeneous PPP with the intensity measure
ΛE (0, t) =2πλE

 ∑
j∈{L,N}
qj (Ωj,in (Ms, t) + Ωj,in (ms, t)) + ΩN,out (Ms, , t) + ΩN,out (ms, t)

 , (11)
where qL , C, qN , 1 − C, and Ωj,in(V, t) , PrGb(V )
(V Cjt)
2
αj
αj
∑Nj−1
m=0
γ
(
m+ 2
αj
, D
αj
V Cjt
)
m!
, Ωj,out(V, t) ,
PrGb(V )
(V Cjt)
2
αj
αj
∑Nj−1
m=0
Γ
(
m+ 2
αj
, D
αj
V Cjt
)
m!
, with V ∈ {Ms, ms}.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix D.
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Fig. 1. Secure connectivity probability of the mmWave communication in the presence of multiple non-colluding eavesdroppers vs
λE with BW=2GHz, Pt = 30 dB, FdB = 10, θb = 9o, Ms = 15 dB, and ms = −3 dB.
The following theorem gives the analysis result of the secure connectivity probability in the presence
of non-colluding eavesdroppers.
Theorem 1: In the case of non-colluding eavesdroppers, the secure connectivity probability is
τn =
∑
j∈{L,N}
Aj
∫ D
0
frj(r)dr
∫ +∞
0
e
−ΛE
(
0, r
αj
MswCj
)
wNj−1e−w
Γ(Nj)
dw. (12)
Proof: We have the following derivations:
Pr
(
MsL(x
∗, o)hx∗o
maxz∈ΦE Gb(θ)L(x
∗, z)gx∗z
≥ 1
)
= Pr
(
min
z∈ΦE
1
Gb(θ)L(x∗, z)gx∗z
≥
1
MsL(x∗, o)hx∗o
)
(e)
= Pr
(
ξ1 ≥
1
MsL(x∗, o)hx∗o
)
(f)
= EL(x∗,o),hx∗o
(
exp
(
−ΛE
(
0,
1
MsL(x∗, o)hx∗o
)))
(g)
= ALErL,hx∗o
(
exp
(
−ΛE
(
0,
rαLL
MsCLhx∗o
)
|Serving BS is a LOS BS
))
+
ANErN ,hx∗o
(
exp
(
−ΛE
(
0,
rαNN
MsCNhx∗o
)
|Serving BS is a NLOS BS
))
, (13)
where step (e) is due to Definition 1, step (f) follows the PPP’s void probability [28], and step (g)
is due to the law of total probability. When the serving BS is a LOS BS, hx∗o ∼ gamma (NL, 1) and
the pdf of rL is given by (7), and when the serving BS is a NLOS BS, hx∗o ∼ gamma (NN , 1) and
the pdf of rN is given by (8). Finally, substituting the pdf of hx∗o, rL, and rN into (13), τn can be
obtained.
Theoretical results in Theorem 1 are validated in Fig. 1, where we plot the secure connectivity
probability τn versus λE. For all the simulations in this paper, 100000 trials are used. From Fig. 1, we
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can find that theoretical curves coincide with the simulation ones well, which validates the theoretical
result in Theorem 1.
2) Average number of perfect communication links per unit area: In the following, we study the
average number of perfect communication links per unit area, Np, of the mmWave communication
in the presence of non-colluding eavesdroppers. Firstly, we should derive the analytical result of the
connection probability and secrecy probability of a mmWave communication link, given by
pcon , Pr (SNRU ≥ Tc) and psec,n , Pr
(
max
z∈ΦE
SNREz ≤ Te
)
, (14)
respectively, where Tc , 2Rc−1 and Te , 2Re−1. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 2: For the non-colluding eavesdroppers case, the analytical result of pcon is given by
pcon =
∫ D
0
Γ
(
NL,
N0TcrαL
PtMSCL
)
Γ(NL)
frL(r)drAL +
∫ +∞
0
Γ
(
NN ,
N0TcrαN
PtMSCN
)
Γ(NN )
frN (r)drAN , (15)
and the analytical result of psec,n is given by
psec,n = exp
(
−ΛE
(
0,
1
TeN0
))
. (16)
Proof: pcon can be derived as follows
pcon =Pr
(
hx∗o ≥
N0Tc
PtMSL(x∗, o)
|Serving BS is a LOS BS
)
AL+
Pr
(
hx∗o ≥
N0Tc
PtMSL(x∗, o)
|Serving BS is a NLOS BS
)
AN
=
∫ D
0
Γ
(
NL,
N0TcrαL
PtMSCL
)
Γ(NL)
frL(r)drAL +
∫ +∞
0
Γ
(
NN ,
N0TcrαN
PtMSCN
)
Γ(NN)
frN (r)drAN . (17)
psec,n can be derived as follows
psec,n = Pr
{
maxzφEz Gb(θ)L(x
∗, z)gx∗,z
N0
≤ Te
}
(g)
= Pr
{
1
ξ1N0
≤ Te
}
(h)
= exp
(
−ΛE
(
0,
1
TeN0
))
,
(18)
where step (g) is due to Definition 1, and step (h) is due to the PPP’s void probability [28].
B. Colluding Eavesdroppers
In this subsection, we study the secrecy performance of the mmWave communication by considering
the worst case: colluding eavesdroppers, where distributed eavesdroppers adopt the maximal-ratio
combining to process the wiretapped confidential information.
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1) Secure Connectivity Probability: The secure connectivity probability τc in the presence of mul-
tiple colluding eavesdroppers can be calculated by
τc = Pr
(
MsL(x
∗, o)hx∗o
IE
≥ 1
)
, (19)
where IE ,
∑
z∈ΦE
Gb(θ)L(x
∗, z)gx∗z. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 3: In the case of colluding eavesdroppers, τc can be calculated by
τc = Erj

 ∑
j∈{L,N}
Nj−1∑
m=0
(
r
αj
j
MSCj
)m
Aj
Γ(m+ 1)
(−1)mL(m)IE
(
r
αj
j
MSCj
) , (20)
where LIE(s) , exp (Ξ(s)) and
Ξ(s) ,− s

2πλE ∑
j∈{L,N}
qj

 ∑
V ∈{Ms,ms}
PrGb(V )
(V Cj)
2
αj
αj
Nj−1∑
m=0
(Dαj/(V Cj))
m+ 2
αj(
m+ 2
αj
)
(s +Dαj/(V Cj))
m+1
2F1
(
1, m+ 1;m+
2
αj
+ 1;
Dαj/(V Cj)
Dαj/(V Cj) + s
))
+ 2πλE
∑
V ∈{Ms,ms}
PrGb(V )
(V CN)
2
αN
αN
NN−1∑
m=0
(DαN/(V CN))
m+ 2
αN(
1− 2
αN
)
(s+DαN/(V CN))
m+1
2F1
(
1, m+ 1; 2−
2
αN
;
s
s+DαN/(V CN)
) . (21)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix E.
Although the analytical result given in Theorem 3 is general and exact, it is rather unwieldy,
motivating the interest in acquiring a more compact expression. Exploring the tight lower bound
of the CDF of the gamma random variable in [31], a tight upper bound of τc can be calculated as
follows.
Theorem 4: τc can be tightly upper bounded by
τc /
∑
j∈{L,N}
Nj∑
n=1
(
Nj
n
)
(−1)n+1
∫ +∞
0
frj(r)LIE
(
ajnr
αj
MSCj
)
dr, (22)
where aL , (NL)
− 1
NL and aN , (NN)−
1
NN .
Proof: We leverage the tight lower bound of the CDF of a normalized gamma random variable,
g with N degrees of freedom as Pr (x ≤ y) ' (1− e−κy)N [31], where κ = (N !)− 1N . Since hx∗,o is a
normalized gamma random variable, we have
τc / 1−
∑
j∈{L,N}
EIE ,rj

(1− exp
(
−
najIEr
αj
j
MSCj
))Nj . (23)
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Fig. 2. Secure connectivity probability of mmWave communication in the presence of multiple colluding eavesdroppers vs λE .
The system parameters are Pt = 30 dB, βL = 61.4 dB, αL = 2, βN = 72 dB, αN = 2.92, BW = 2 GHz, FdB = 10, λB =
0.0005, 0.0002, 0.00006, C = 0.12, D = 200 m, θb = 9
o
, Ms = 15 dB, and ms = −3 dB.
Using the binomial expansion, we can obtain
τc /
∑
j∈{L,N}
Nj∑
n=1
(
Nj
n
)
(−1)n+1Erj
(
EIE
(
exp
(
−
ajnr
αj
j IE
MSCj
)))
=
∑
j∈{L,N}
Nj∑
n=1
(
Nj
n
)
(−1)n+1
∫ +∞
0
frj (r)LIE
(
ajnr
αj
MSCj
)
. (24)
The bounds in Theorem 4 are validated in Fig. 2, where we plot the secure connectivity probability
τc versus λE. From Fig. 2, we can find that theoretical curves coincide with simulation ones well,
which show that the upper bound given in Theorem 4 is tight.
2) Average number of perfect communication links per unit area: In the case of colluding eaves-
droppers, the connection probability pcon of the typical authorized user can be still calculated by (15)
in Theorem 2, and the achievable secrecy probability psec can be calculated by
psec,c = Pr
{
PtIE
N0
≤ Te
}
. (25)
For getting the analysis result of psec,c in (25), the CDF of IE should be available. Although the
CDF of IE can be obtained from its Laplace transform LIE(s) by using the inverse Laplace transform
calculation [32], it could get computationally intensive in certain cases and may render the analysis
intractable. As an alternative, we resort to an approximation method widely adopted in [4], [8], [10]
for getting an approximation of psec,c which is given in the following theorem.
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Fig. 3. Secrecy Probability of the mmWave communication in the presence of multiple colluding eavesdroppers vs Te. The system
parameters are Pt = 30 dB, θb = 9o, Ms = 15 dB, ma = −3 dB, βL = 61.4 dB, αL = 2, βN = 72 dB, αN = 2.92, BW = 2 GHz,
FdB = 10, λB = 0.0005, C = 0.081, and D = 250 m.
Theorem 5: In the case of multiple colluding eavesdroppers, the approximation of psec,c is given by
psec,c /
N∑
n=1
(−1)n+1 LIE
(
−
an
n0Te
)
, (26)
where LIE(s) is given in Theorem 3, a , (N !)
1
N and N is the number of terms used in approximation.
Proof:
psec,c = Pr
{
PtIE
N0Te
≤ 1
}
(i)
≈ Pr
{
PtIE
N0Te
≤ w
}
. (27)
In (i), w is a normalized gamma random variable with a shape parameter, N , and the approximation
in (i) is due to the fact that a normalized gamma random variable converges to identity when its shape
parameter goes to infinity [4], [8].
Then, using the tight lower of the CDF of a normalized gamma random variable in [31], psec can
be tightly upper bounded by
psec,c / 1−
(
1− exp
(
−
aPtIE
N0Te
))N
. (28)
Finally, using the binomial expansion, (28) can be further rewritten as (26).
The approximate analysis result in Theorem 5 is validated in Fig. 3. From Fig. 3, we can find that
when N = 5, (26) can give an accurate approximation. Then, in the following simulations, we set
N = 5 to calculate psec,c, approximately.
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IV. SECRECY PERFORMANCE OF THE INTERFERENCE-LIMITED MMWAVE NETWORK WITH AN
AN has been proved to be an efficient secure transmission strategy for the conventional cellular
network [18], [19]. But for the mmWave network, the utility of the AN should be re-evaluated due to
the distinguishing features of the mmWave communication. In this section, we will analyze the secrecy
performance of the AN-assisted mmWave communication. Since the additional AN would increase
the network interference, different from the previous section, we analyze the secrecy performance
of the AN assisted mmWave communication by taking the inter-cell interference into consideration2.
For obtaining a tractable problem, we only study the second secrecy performance metric: the average
number of perfect communication links per unit area for the non-colluding eavesdroppers case.
By introducing different phase shifts in each directional antenna, each BS can concentrate the
transmit power of the confidential information signals into the direction of its intended receiver, while
radiating AN uniformly in all other directions. For tractability of the analysis, the actual array pattern
of each BS is approximated by the model of sectoring with artificial noise proposed in [19, Section
II-A]. In particular, for the confidential information signals, it has main lobe of gain Ms and angle of
spread θb, and just as [19], [33], the sidelobes of the confidential information signals are suppressed
sufficiently, which can be omitted in the following3. Accordingly, for the AN, it has main lobe of gain
Ma and angle of spread 360− θb, and the sidelobes of the AN are suppressed sufficiently, which can
also be omitted. The sectors of the confidential signals and AN are non-overlapping.
Assuming that φPt is allocated to transmit the confidential information in the intended sector, and
(1 − φ)Pt is allocated to transmit AN concurrently out of intended sectors, where 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1. The
transmit power x(θ) of each BS is
x(θ)=
{
MsφPt, if |θ| ≤ θb, Prx(Ms) , Pr (x(θ) = MsφPt) = θ180 ,
Ma(1− φ)Pt, Otherwise, Prx(Ma) , Pr (x(θ) = Ma(1− φ)Pt) = 180−θ180 .
(29)
Then, according to the mapping theorem, for any receiver (authorized user or eavesdropper), the
2In the mmWave network with AN, the transmitted AN simultaneously from each BS has made the transmissions of mmWave signals
no longer highly directional. Therefore, different from mmWave network without AN, the out-cell interference should be taken into
consideration in the mmWave network with AN.
3We should point out that the analysis results obtained in this section can be generalized to incorporate the sidelobe leakage signals,
by considering the eavesdroppers in the intended sector and outside the intended sector separately, just as Section III. However, the
analysis results in such case would become more complicated, whilst few design insights can be brought. Furthermore, as we know,
massive antenna array would be deployed at the mmWave BS for improving the mmWave signal transmission performance [1], [5].
Therefore, the sidelobes of the antenna pattern at the mmWave BS can be suppressed sufficiently, and it is reasonable to omit the
sidelobe in the theoretical analysis.
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interfering BSs can be divided into two independent PPPs: 1) the one transmitting the confidential
signals to the receiver, which is denoted by ΦI of intensity λBPrx(Ms); 2) the one transmitting the
AN to the receiver, which is denoted by ΦA of intensity λBPrx(Ma).
A. Connection Probability
Considering the typical authorized user at the origin, its received SINRU can be calculated by
SINRU =
φPtMshx∗oL (x
∗, o)
IB +N0
, (30)
where the interference from multiple interfering BSs: IB ,
∑
y∈ΦI/x∗
MsφPthyx∗L(y, x
∗)+
∑
y∈ΦA
Ma(1−
φ)Pthyx∗L(y, x
∗). We have the following theorem.
Theorem 6: The connection probability of the typical communication link can be tightly upper
bounded by
pcon , Pr (SINRU ≥ Tc) / AL
∫ D
0
ΞLfrL(r)dr + AN
∫ +∞
0
ΞNfrN (r)dr, (31)
where
ΞL ,
NL∑
n=1
(−1)n+1
(
NL
n
)
exp (−ΘL(n)rαLN0)
3∏
k=1
̟k(Ms, φ, n)
3∏
k=1
̟k(Ma, 1− φ, n), (32)
ΞN ,
NL∑
n=1
(−1)n+1
(
NL
n
)
exp (−ΘN (n)rαNN0)
3∏
k=1
ϕk(Ms, φ, n)
3∏
k=1
ϕk(Ma, 1− φ, n), (33)
̟1(a, b, n) , ∆(C, r,D,ΘL(n), rαL, a, b),
̟2(a, b, n) , ∆
(
1− C,min
((
CN
CL
) 1
αN
r
αL
αN , D
)
, D,ΘL(n), r
αL , a, b
)
,
̟3(a, b, n) , ∆
(
1,max
((
CN
CL
) 1
αN
r
αL
αN , D
)
,+∞,ΘL(n), r
αL, a, b
)
,
ϕ1(a, b, n) , ∆
(
C,min
((
CL
CN
) 1
αL
r
αN
αL , D
)
, D,ΘN(n), r
αN , a, b
)
,
ϕ2(a, b, n) , ∆(1− C,min (r,D), D,ΘN(n), rαN , a, b) ,
ϕ3(a, b, n) , ∆(1,min(r,D),+∞,ΘN(n), rαN , a, b) , (34)
aL and aN have been defined in Theorem 4, the analysis results of frL(r) and frN (r) have been
given in Lemma 3, ΘL(n) , TcnaLφPtMsCL , ΘN (n) ,
TcnaN
φPtMsCN
, F (c, d, a, b) , 1 − 1
(1+cdabPtCLy−αL)
NL
,
∆(z, v, y, c, d, a, b) , exp
(
−2πzλBPrx(a)
∫ y
v
F (c, d, a, b) ydy
)
,
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Fig. 4. Connection probability of mmWave communication with AN vs Tc. The system parameters are Pt = 30 dB, φ = 0.5, θb =
9,Ms = 15dB, Ma = 3dB, βL = 61.4 dB, αL = 2, βN = 72 dB, αN = 2.92, BW = 2 GHz, FdB = 10, C = 0.12, and D = 200 m.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix F.
In Fig. 4, we plot the connection probability pcon versus Tc. From Fig. 4, we can find that approximate
results coincide with simulation ones well, which show that the approximate analysis result given in
Theorem 6 is tight. In addition, from simulation results, we can find an interesting phenomenon that
for some Tc, a larger λB may result in a smaller pcon. Therefore, we can conclude that pcon is not a
monotonically increasing function of λB for the whole range of Tc. This can be explained by the fact
that although the distance from the authorized user to its serving BS decreases with the increasing
λB , the network interference also increases. Therefore, increasing λB may not always improve pcon.
This further shows that the mmWave network with AN is interference-limited.
B. Secrecy Probability
In this subsection, we characterize the secrecy probability of the AN assisted mmWave communi-
cation. With the approximation (29), only eavesdroppers inside the intended sector of the serving BS
would wiretap the confidential information. Those eavesdroppers form a fan-shaped PPP and by the
mapping theorem [28], they can be mapped as a homogeneous PPP on the whole plane, denoted by ΦZ
with density λEPrx(Ms). Since we consider the worst-case where each eavesdropper can eliminate the
interference due to the information signals from other interfering BSs, only the AN would deteriorate
the receiving performance of eavesdroppers. Then, the received SINR by the eavesdropper at z can
be calculated as
SINRz =
φPtMSL(x
∗, z)gx∗z
IAz +N0
, (35)
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Fig. 5. Secrecy probability of mmWave communication with AN versus Te. The system parameters are Pt = 30 dB, θb = 9o,
Ms = 15dB, Ma = 3dB, BW = 2 GHz, βL = 61.4 dB, αL = 2, βN = 72 dB, αN = 2.92, FdB = 10, φ = 0.5, Pt = 30dB,
λB = 0.00005, C = 0.12, and D = 200 m.
where IAz =
∑
y∈ΦA
(1− φ)PtMagy,zL(y, z).
In the case of non-colluding eavesdroppers, the secrecy probability of the mmWave network with AN
can be calculated as psec = EΦZ ,ΦA
(∏
z∈ΦZ
Pr (SINRz ≤ Te)
)
, which is characterized by the following
theorem.
Theorem 7: The secrecy probability can be tightly lower bounded by
psec 'exp
(
−2πCλEPrx(Ms)
∫ D
0
ΩL(r)rdr − 2π(1− C)λEPrx(Ms)
∫ D
0
ΩN (r)rdr
)
exp
(
−2πλEPrx(Ms)
∫ +∞
D
ΩN (r)rdr
)
, (36)
where aj , (Nj!)
− 1
Nj , Ωj(r) ,
∑Nj
n=1(−1)
n+1
(
Nj
n
)
exp
(
−najTer
αjN0
φPtMsCj
)
exp
(
Ψ
(
(1−φ)najTer
αj
φMsCj
))
, j =
{L,N}, and
Ψ(s) ,− s

2πλB ∑
j∈{L,N}
qj

Prx(Ma)(MaCj)
2
αj
αj
Nj−1∑
m=0
(Dαj/(yCj))
m+ 2
αj(
m+ 2
αj
)
(s+Dαj/(yCj))
m+1
2F1
(
1, m+ 1;m+
2
αj
+ 1;
Dαj/(MaCj)
Dαj/(MaCj) + s
))
+ 2πλEPrx(Ma)
(MaCN)
2
αN
αN
NN−1∑
m=0
(DαN/(MaCN))
m+ 2
αN(
1− 2
αN
)
(s +DαN/(MaCN))
m+1
2F1
(
1, m+ 1; 2−
2
αN
;
s
s+DαN/(MaCN)
) .
(37)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix G.
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Fig. 6. Secrecy connectivity probability of the noise-limited mmWave communication in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers versus
λE . The system parameters are λB = 0.00005, C = 0.081, and D = 250 m.
Theoretical results in Theorem 7 are validated in Fig. 5. In Fig. 5, we plot the secrecy probability
psec versus Te. From Fig. 5, we can find that the approximate results coincide with the simulation
ones well, which show that the lower bound given in Theorem 7 is tight.
V. SIMULATION RESULT
In this section, more representative simulation results are provided to characterize the secrecy per-
formance of mmWave networks and the effect of different network parameters. Considering mmWave
networks operating at a carrier frequency Fc = 28 GHz, the path-loss model are taken from [5, Tables
I]. Specially, the transmission bandwidth BW = 2 GHz, the noise figure FdB = 10, the BS’s transmit
power Pt = 30 dB, the Nakagami fading parameters of the LOS (NLOS) link are NL = 3 (NN = 2),
and the path-loss model: βL = 61.4 dB, αL = 2, βN = 72 dB, αN = 2.92. Since the theoretical
analysis results obtained in this paper have been validated by the simulation results in Fig. 1-Fig. 5,
all of the simulation results in this section are theoretical analysis results.
A. Secrecy performance evaluation of noise-limited mmWave cellular networks
In this subsection, employing analysis results in Section III, we illustrate the secrecy performance
of noise-limited mmWave networks in the presence of non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers.
Fig. 6 plots the secrecy connectivity probability of the mmWave communication in the presence of
multiple non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers versus λE. Obviously, the wiretapping capability
of the colluding eavesdroppers is larger than the non-colluding case. Therefore, compared with the non-
colluding eavesdroppers, the secrecy connectivity probability for the colluding case deteriorates. With
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Fig. 7. Average number of perfect communication links per unit, Np of the noise-limited mmWave communication in the presence of
multiple eavesdroppers versus λE . The system parameters are Pt = 30 dB, Tc=10dB, Te=0 dB, λB = 0.0002, C = 0.12, and D = 200
m.
the increasing λE , the wiretapping capability of eavesdroppers increases and the secrecy connectivity
probability decreases. Furthermore, the secrecy performance would be improved with the improving
directionality of the beamforming of each BSs. This can be explained by the fact that the high gain
narrow beam antenna decreases the information leakage, improves the receive performance of the
authorized user, and increases the secure connectivity probability.
Fig. 7 plots Np versus λE . Compared with the non-colluding eavesdroppers, the performance
deterioration of the colluding case increases with the increasing λE , especially for the BS equipped
with highly directional antenna arrays. Furthermore, the simulation results show that the directional
beamforming is very important for the secrecy communication. For example, for the non-colluding
eavesdroppers case, when θb = 9o,Ms = 15dB, Ma = 3dB, λE = 4 × 10−4, Np ≈ 1.1 × 10−4 and
more than half of communication links is perfect, on average. However, for other two cases of array
patterns, Np reduces greatly due to the increasing beam width of the main lobe and the decreasing
array gains of the intended sector.
The simulation results above show that the directional beamforming of BSs is very important for
the secrecy performance of noise-limited mmWave networks. Therefore, in practice, for improving the
security of noise-limited mmWave networks, BSs should perform the highly directional beamforming.
B. Secrecy performance evaluation of interference-limited mmWave cellular networks with AN
In this subsection, employing analysis results in Section IV, we illustrate the impact of the AN on
the secrecy performance of interference-limited mmWave networks in the presence of non-colluding
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Fig. 9. Average number of perfect communication links per unit, Np of the interference-limited mmWave communication in the presence
of multiple non-colluding eavesdroppers versus the power allocation coefficient φ and λE . The system parameters are θb = 30o, Ms = 10
dB, Ma = 3 dB, Tc = 10dB, Te = 0 dB, λB = 0.001, C = 0.12, and D = 200 m.
eavesdroppers.
Fig. 8 plots Np achieved by the mmWave communication versus the power allocation coefficient φ
for different antenna patterns and λE. From the simulation results in Fig. 8, we find that the optimal
fraction of the power allocated to the AN decreases with the decreasing λE and improving directivity of
the antenna array equipped at each BS. This can be explained by the fact that with the decreasing λE,
the wiretapping capability of eavesdroppers decreases, and the optimal fraction of the power allocated
to the AN can be reduced. Accordingly, with the highly directional beamforming, the information
leakage decreases, and the receiving performance of eavesdroppers decreases. Therefore, the power
allocated to the AN can be reduced. For showing the effect of λE and θb on the optimal φ further, we
plot Np versus φ and λE in Fig. 9, and Np versus φ and θb in Fig. 10. From the simulation results,
it is clear that the optimal φ for maximizing NP increases with the decreasing λE and decreasing θb,
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Fig. 11. Secrecy performance comparison between the microwave network and mmWave network. The system parameters of the
mmWave network are Pt = 30 dB, Tc=0dB, Te=-30 dB, θb = 9o, Ms = 15 dB, Ma = 3 dB, λB = 0.0008, C = 0.12, and D = 200
m. The system parameters of the microwave network are Pt = 30 dB, Tc=0dB, Te=-30 dB, the beam width of the confidential signal
is 60o, the beam width of AN is 300o, the number of antennas equipped at each microwave BS is 6, λB = 0.0008, the small scale
channel fading follows the normalized Rayleigh fading. .
which validates the conclusions draw above.
Simulation results show that the optimal power allocated to AN depends on λE and antenna pattern.
The highly directional antenna array and small λE both would decrease the power allocated to AN.
C. Secrecy performance comparison between the AN assisted microwave network and the AN assisted
mmWave network
For validating the secrecy performance of the mmWave communication, we perform the secrecy
performance comparison between the microwave network and mmWave network in Fig. 11, where the
intensities of microwave BSs and mmWave BSs are both set to be 0.0008. The carrier frequency of the
microwave communication is Fc = 2.5 GHz. Just as [19], [33], the antenna pattern of the microwave BS
is approximated by (29), where the beam width of the confidential signal is set to be 60o, and the beam
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width of AN is set to be 300o, the small scale channel fading of the microwave communication is the
normalized Rayleigh fading. The large-scale path loss of the urban area cellular radio communication
is used to model the path-loss of the microwave communication [34], where the path-loss exponent is
2.7. Since the microwave network is interference-limited [19], the received noise power is ignored in
the simulation. Therefore, only the ratio between the antenna gain of the confidential signals and the
antenna gain of AN would determine the SINR received at the typical authorized user and eavesdropper
in the microwave network [19]. Just as [19], the ratio between the antenna gain of the confidential
signals and the antenna gain of AN in the microwave BS is set to be M − 1, where M is the number
of antennas equipped at the microwave BS. In the simulation results of Fig. 11, we set M = 6. From
the simulation results in Fig. 11, we can find that the mmWave network can achieve better secrecy
performance than the microwave network. This is because the unique characteristic of the mmWave
communication: blockage effects and highly directional beamforming antenna arrays. Due to blockage
effects, the wiretapping capability of eavesdroppers would decreases, since the blockage effects would
deteriorate the reception quality of a large portion of eavesdroppers. Due to the highly directional
beamforming antenna arrays equipped at each mmWave BS, the reception quality of the intended
receiver would be improved, and the confidential information leakage would be decreased.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, considering distinguishing features of the mmWave cellular network, we characterize
the secrecy performance of the noise-limited mmWave network and the AN-assisted mmWave network.
For the noise-limited case, we analyze the secure connectivity probability and average number of
perfect communication links per unit area for colluding and non-colluding eavesdroppers. For the
AN-assisted mmWave network which is interference-limited, by taking the network interference into
consideration, we characterize the distributions of the received SINRs at the intended receiver and
eavesdroppers, and average number of perfect communication links per unit area for non-colluding
eavesdroppers. Simulation results show that the array pattern and intensity of eavesdroppers are very
important system parameters for improving the secrecy performance of the mmWave communication.
In particular, for the AN-assisted mmWave networks, the power allocated to AN depends on the array
pattern and the intensity of eavesdroppers. It decreases with the decreasing beam width of the main
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lobe and decreasing intensity of eavesdroppers.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We first show the derivation of fd∗
L
(r). Given the typical authorized user observes at least one LOS
BS, the complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of d∗L can be derived as
Pr (d∗L ≥ r) , Pr (ΦBL (B(o, r)) = 0|ΦBL (B(o,D)) 6= 0) =
e−CλBpir
2
(
1− e−CλBpi(D
2−r2)
)
1− e−CλBpiD2
, (38)
Then, with (38), the pdf fd∗
L
(r) = −
dPr(d∗L≥r)
dr
that can be derived as (4).
Secondly, invoking the PPP’s void probability [28], the CCDF Pr (d∗N ≥ r) can be derived as
Pr (d∗N ≥ r) =
Pr (ΦBN (B(o, r)) = 0) I(r ≤ D) + Pr (ΦBN (B(o,D)) = 0,ΦBN (B(o, r)/B(o,D)) = 0) I(r > D)
= exp
(
(1− C)λBπr
2
)
I(r ≤ D) + exp
(
(1− C) λBπD
2
)
exp
(
−λBπ
(
r2 −D2
))
I(r > D). (39)
Finally, calculating −dPr(d
∗
N
≥r)
dr
, the pdf fd∗
N
(r) can be derived as (5).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
We do the following derivations.
AN = Pr
(
CL(d
∗
L)
−αL ≤ CN(d
∗
N)
−αN
)
Pr (ΦBL(B(o,D)) 6= 0) + Pr (ΦBL(B(o,D)) = 0)
= Pr
((
CL
CN
) 1
αL
(d∗N)
αN
αL ≤ d∗L
)(
1− e−piCλBD
2
)
+ e−piCλBD
2
= E
d∗
N
≤
(
CL
CN
)
−
1
αN D
αL
αN
(
e
−piCλB
(
CL
CN
) 2
αL (d∗N )
2αN
αL
− e−piCλBD
2
)
+ e−piCλBD
2
. (40)
Finally, (6) can be obtained by employing the pdf fd∗
N
(r) in (5). Accordingly, AL can be derived as
AL = Pr
(
CL(d
∗
L)
−αL ≥ CN(d
∗
N)
−αN
)
Pr (ΦBL(B(o,D)) 6= 0)
=
(
Pr
(
D ≥
(
CL
CN
) 1
αL
(d∗N)
αN
αL ≥ d∗L
)
+ Pr
(
D ≤
(
CL
CN
) 1
αL
(d∗N)
αN
αL
))
Pr (ΦBL(B(o,D)) 6= 0)
=
(∫ µ
0
(
Pr
((
CL
CN
) 1
αL
r
αN
αL ≥ d∗L
))
fd∗
N
(r)dr + Pr (d∗N ≥ µ)
)
Pr (ΦBL(B(o,D)) 6= 0) . (41)
Since Pr (d∗L ≤ r) = 1−Pr (d∗L ≥ r) and Pr (d∗L ≥ r) has been defined in (38), substituting the analytical
expression of Pr (d∗L ≤ r) and fd∗N (r) in (5) into (41), we obtain AL = 1− AN .
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
We first show the derivation of frL(r). The CCDF Pr (rL ≥ r) can be derived as
Pr (rL ≥ r) , Pr
(
ΦBL(B(o, r)) = 0
∣∣CL(d∗L)−αL ≥ CN(d∗N)−αN )
=
Pr (ΦBL(B(o,D)) 6= 0) Pr (r ≤ d∗L, CL(d∗L)−αL ≥ CN(d∗N)−αN )
Pr (CL(d∗L)−αL ≥ CN(d∗N)−αN )
(a)
=
1
AL
∫ D
r
Pr
(
ΦN ∩ b
(
o,
(
CN
CL
) 1
αN
y
αL
αN
)
= ∅
)
2πCλByexp
(
−πCλBy
2
)
dy. (42)
Step (a) can be derived by the PPP’s void probability and fd∗
L
(r). Then calculating frL(r) = −
dPr(rL≥r)
dr
,
the pdf frL(r) can be derived as (7).
We show the derivation of frN (r). The CCDF Pr (rN ≥ r) is equivalent to the conditional CCDF
Pr (rN ≥ r) , Pr
(
d∗N ≥ r
∣∣CL(d∗L)−αL ≤ CN(d∗N)−αN ) =
Pr (r ≤ d∗N , CL(d∗L)−αL ≤ CN(d∗N)−αN ) Pr (ΦBL (B(o,D)) 6= 0)
AN
+
Pr (r ≤ d∗N ,ΦBL (B(o,D)) = 0)
AN
.
(43)
We first derive the first term in (43) as
Ed∗
N
≥r
(
Pr
((
CL
CN
) 1
αL (d∗N)
αN
αL ≤ d∗L
))
Pr (ΦBL (B(o,D)) 6= 0)
AN
(44)
(b)
=
Ed∗
N
≥r
(
exp
(
−CλBπ
(
CL
CN
) 2
αL (d∗N)
2αN
αL
)
− exp (−CλBπD2)
)
AN
I
(
r ≤
(
CN
CL
) 1
αN
D
αL
αN
)
(45)
Step (b) is obtained according to the PPP’s void probability.
Finally, we derive the second term in (43). Since the LOS BS process and NLOS BS process are
two independent PPPs, we have
Pr (r ≤ d∗N ,ΦBL (B(o,D)) = 0)
AN
=
exp (−(1− C)λBπr2 − CλBπD2)
AN
I (r ≤ D) +
e−λBpir
2
AN
I (r ≥ D) .
(46)
Substituting (46) and (45) into (43), frN (r) = −dPr(rN≥r)dr , which can be derived as (8).
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
The point process NE can be regarded as a transformation of the point process ΦE by the probability
kernel p (z, A) = Pr
(
1
Gb(θ)gxzL(x,z)
∈ A
)
, z ∈ R2, A ∈ B(R+). According to the displacement theorem
[28], NE is a PPP on R+ with the intensity measure ΛE (0, t) given by
ΛE (0, t) = λE
∫
R2
Pr
(
1
Gb(θ)gxzL(x, z)
∈ [0, t]
)
dz. (47)
From the blockage model in Section II-B, we know that ΦE is divided into two independent point
processes, i.e., the LOS and NLOS eavesdropper processes. Furthermore, the directivity gains received
at the eavesdroppers in the main and sidelobes are different. Therefore, considering these and changing
to a polar coordinate system, ΛE (0, t) in (47) can be further derived as
ΛE (0, t) =2πλE
∑
V ∈{Ms,ms}
PrGb(V )
∑
j∈{L,N}
qj
∫ D
0
Pr
(
rαj
Gb(θ)grCj
≤ t|Gb(θ) = V
)
rdr
+ 2πλE
∑
V ∈{Ms,ms}
PrGb(V )
∫ +∞
D
Pr
(
rαN
Gb(θ)grCN
≤ t|Gb(θ) = V
)
rdr, (48)
where gr denotes the small-scale fading of eavesdropper which is r distant from the target BS at
x. gr ∼ gamma (NL, 1) if the link between the eavesdropper and the target BS is LOS, otherwise,
gr ∼ gamma (NN , 1).
For getting the analysis result ΛE (0, t), the analysis results of integral formulaes in (48) should be
derived. Firstly, the integral
∫ D
0
Pr
(
rαj
Gb(θ)grCj
≤ t|Gb(θ) = V
)
rdr can be derived with the procedures
in (49).∫ D
0
Pr
(
gr ≥
rαj
V Cjt
)
rdr
(a)
=
∫ D
0

1− γ
(
Nj ,
rαj
V Cjt
)
Γ(Nj)

 rdr
(b)
=
∫ D
0
Γ
(
Nj ,
rαj
V Cjt
)
Γ(Nj)
rdr
(c)
=
∫ D
0
e
− r
αj
V Cjt
Nj−1∑
m=0
(
rαj
V Cjt
)m
1
m!
rdr
(d)
=
(V Cjt)
2
αj
αj
Nj−1∑
m=0
γ
(
m+ 2
αj
, D
αj
V Cjt
)
m!
.
(49)
Step (a) is due to gr ∼ gamma (Nj , 1), step (b) is due to [30, eq.(8.356.3)], step (c) is due to [30,
eq.(8.352.2)], and step (d) is due to [30, eq.(3.381.1)].
With a similar procedure, the integral
∫ +∞
D
Pr
(
rαj
Gb(θ)grCj
≤ t|Gb(θ) = V
)
rdr can be derived as
∫ +∞
D
Pr
(
rαj
Gb(θ)grCj
≤ t|Gb(θ) = V
)
rdr =
(V Cjt)
2
αj
αj
Nj−1∑
m=0
Γ
(
m+ 2
αj
, D
αj
V Cjt
)
m!
. (50)
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Finally, substituting (49) and (50) into (48), the proof can be completed.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The achievable secure connectivity probability, τc can be calculated as
τc
(g)
= Erj

EIE

 ∑
j∈{L,N}
e
−
IEr
αj
j
MsCj
Nj−1∑
m=0
(
IEr
αj
j
MsCj
)m
Aj
Γ(m+ 1)




(h)
= Erj

 ∑
j∈{L,N}
Nj−1∑
m=0
(
r
αj
j
MsCj
)m
Aj
Γ(m+ 1)
(−1)mL(m)IE
(
r
αj
j
MsCj
) . (51)
step (g) holds, since the serving BS at x∗ can be a LOS or NLOS BS, and step (h) is due to the
Laplace transform property tnf(t) L↔ (−1)n dn
dsn
Lf(t)(s).
In the following, we derive the analysis result of LIE (s).
LIE (s) = E
(
e
−s
∑
z∈ΦE
Gb(θ)L(x
∗,z)gx∗z
)
(i)
= exp
(∫ +∞
0
(
e−
s
x − 1
)
ΛE(0, dx)
)
(k)
= exp
(
−
∫ +∞
0
ΛE(0, x)
s
x2
e−
s
xdx
)
(v)
= exp

−
∫ +∞
0
ΛE
(
0,
1
z
)
se−szdz︸ ︷︷ ︸
T

 , (52)
step (i) is obtained by using the probability generating functional (PGFL), step (k) is obtained by using
integration by parts, and step (v) is obtained by the variable replacing z = 1
x
. Then, we concentrate
on deriving the analysis result of T in (52). Substituting ΛE(0, 1z ) in (11) into T , T can be rewritten
as
T =− s

2πλE ∑
j∈{L,N}
qj

 ∑
V ∈{Ms,ms}
PrGb(V )
(V Cj)
2
αj
αj
Nj−1∑
m=0
1
m!
∫ ∞
0
γ
(
m+ 2
αj
, D
αj z
V Cj
)
z
2
αj
e−szdz︸ ︷︷ ︸
H1


∑
V ∈{Ms,ms}
PrGb(V )
(V CN)
2
αN
αN
NN−1∑
m=0
1
m!
∫ ∞
0
Γ
(
m+ 2
αN
, D
αN z
V CN
)
z
2
αN
e−szdz︸ ︷︷ ︸
H2

 . (53)
Finally, using [30, eq. (6.455.1)] and [30, eq. (6.455.2)], the integral terms H1 and H2 can be
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calculated as
H1 =
(Dαj/(V Cj))
m+ 2
αj Γ(m+ 1)(
m+ 2
αj
)
(s+Dαj/(V Cj))
m+1
2F1
(
1, m+ 1;m+
2
αj
+ 1;
Dαj/(V Cj)
s+Dαj/(V Cj)
)
, (54)
H2 =
(DαN/(V CN))
m+ 2
αN Γ(m+ 1)(
1− 2
αN
)
(s+DαN/(V Cj))
m+1
2F1
(
1, m+ 1; 2−
2
αN
+ 1;
S
s+Dαj/(V Cj)
)
. (55)
Finally, substituting (54) and (55) into (53), the closed-form result of LIE (s) can be obtained.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 6
Using total probability theorem, we have
Pr (SINRU ≥ Tc) = ALPr (SINRU ≥ Tc|Serving BS is a LOS BS)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q1
+ ANPr (SINRU ≥ Tc|Serving BS is a NLOS BS)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q2
. (56)
In the following, we detail the calculation of the conditional probability Q1. The conditional
probability Q2 can be calculated with a similar procedure which is omitted for brevity. In the following,
we denote the LOS terms in Φi as Φi,L and the NLOS terms in Φi as Φi,N , for i = I, A.
Q1 = Pr

hx∗o ≥ TcrαLL
(∑
y∈ΦI
MsφPthyx∗L(y, x
∗) +
∑
y∈ΦA
Ma(1− φ)PthxoL(y, x∗) +N0
)
φPtMsCL

 (z)/
1− E
(
1− exp
(
−
aLTcr
αL
L
φPtMsCL
(∑
y∈ΦI
MsφPthyx∗L(y, x
∗) +
∑
y∈ΦA
Ma(1− φ)Pthyx∗L(y, x
∗) +N0
)))NL
(x)
= ErL

 NL∑
n=1
(−1)n+1
(
NL
n
)
exp (−ΘL(n)rαLL N0)
∏
j∈{L,N}
EΦI,j

 ∏
y∈ΦI,j
(1 + ΘL(n)r
αL
L MsφPtL(y, x
∗))−Nj


∏
j∈{L,N}
EΦA,j

 ∏
y∈ΦA,j
(1 + ΘL(n)r
αL
L Ma(1− φ)PtL(y, x
∗))−Nj



 . (57)
Step (z) is due to the tight lower bound of the CDF of the gamma random variable given in [31];
step (x) is due to the multinomial expansion and Laplace transform of the gamma random variable.
On the condition that the serving BS is a LOS BS and the distance from the serving BS to the
typical user is rL, from the user association policy in Section II-F, we know that the nearest distance
from the interfering BS in ΦI,L and ΦA,L to the typical authorized user should be larger than rL, and
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the nearest distance from the interfering BS in ΦI,N and ΦA,N to the typical authorized user should
be larger than
(
CN
CL
) 1
αN r
αL
αN
L . Then, using PGFL, we have
EΦI,L

 ∏
y∈ΦI,L
(1 + ΘL(n)r
αL
L MsφPtL(y, x
∗))−NL

 = ̟1(Ms, φ, n)
EΦI,N

 ∏
y∈ΦI,N
(1 + ΘL(n)r
αL
L MsφPtL(y, x
∗))−NN

 = ̟2(Ms, φ, n)̟3(Ms, φ, n) (58)
Similarly, the analysis resut of EΦA,j
(∏
y∈ΦA,j
(1 + ΘL(n)r
αL
L Ma(1− φ)PtL(y, x
∗))−Nj
)
, j ∈ {L,N}
can be obtained. Finally, substituting the pdf of rL into (57), the proof can be completed.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THEOREM 7
In the following, for the convenience of expression, we denote the set of the LOS eavesdroppers in
ΦZ as ΦZ,L, and denote the set of the NLOS eavesdroppers as ΦZ,N .
Since the AN signals received at multiple eavesdroppers are not independent, we resort to the
technique in [19] to derive a lower bound of psec. We first derive the conditional secrecy probability
conditioned on ΦA. Then, with the Jensen’s inequality, we derive a lower bound of psec. Specially
psec =EΦA

EΦZ,L,ΦZ,N

 ∏
z∈ΦZ,L
Pr (SINRz ≤ Te|ΦA)
∏
z∈ΦZ,N
Pr (SINRz ≤ Te|ΦA)




=EΦA
(
exp
(
−CλEPrx(Ms)
∫
R2∩B(o,D)
Pr (SINRz ≥ Te|z ∈ ΦZ,L,ΦA) dz
− (1− C)λEPrx(Ms)
∫
R2∩B(o,D)
Pr (SINRz ≥ Te|z ∈ ΦZ,N ,ΦA) dz
−λEPrx(Ms)
∫
R2/B(o,D)
Pr (SINRz ≥ Te|z ∈ ΦZ,N ,ΦA) dz
))
(n)
'exp
(
−2πCλEPrx(Ms)
∫ D
0
Pr (SINRz ≥ Te|z ∈ ΦZ,L) rdr
)
exp
(
−2π(1− C)λEPrx(Ms)
∫ D
0
Pr (SINRz ≥ Te|z ∈ ΦZ,N) rdr
)
exp
(
−2πλEPrx(Ms)
∫ +∞
D
Pr (SINRz ≥ Te|z ∈ ΦZ,N) rdr
)
, (59)
where r denotes the link length between the eavesdropper and the serving BS. We should point out
that the conditional probabilities in the first line of the equation (59) denote the probabilities that the
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SINR received by eavesdroppers at different positions is not larger than Te, conditioned on a common
ΦA. Changing to a polar coordinate system and using Jensen’s inequality, we can obtain step (n).
In the following, we first show the derivation of Pr (SINRz ≥ Te|z ∈ ΦZ,L). Then, similar procedures
can be adopted to derive Pr (SINRz ≥ Te|z ∈ ΦZ,N), which are omitted, for brevity.
Pr (SINRz ≥ Te|z ∈ ΦZ,L) = Pr
(
gx∗z ≥
rαLTe (IAz +N0)
φPtMsCL
|z ∈ ΦZ,L
)
(v)
/
1− EΦA
(
1− e
−
TerαLaL(IAz+N0)
φPtMsCL
)NL
=
Ni∑
n=1
(−1)n+1
(
NL
n
)
e
−
naLTeN0r
αL
φPtMsCL LIAz
(
naLTerαL
φPtMsCL
)
, (60)
Since gx∗z ∼ gamma (NL, 1), with the inequality in [31], step (v) can be obtained.
For facilitating the derivations, we first introduce the following definition.
Definition 2: The path loss process with fading (PLPF) Nz is the point process on R+ mapped from
ΦA, where Nz ,
{
ζy =
1
MagyzL(y,z)
, y ∈ ΦA
}
and z ∈ R2. We sort the elements of Nz in ascending
order and introduce the index such that ζi ≤ ζj for ∀i < j.
Then, following the proof of Lemma 4, the intensity measure of Nz can be calculated as
Λz (0, t) =2πλB
∑
j∈{L,N}
qjPrx(Ma)
(MaCjt)
2
αj
αj
Nj−1∑
m=0
γ
(
m+ 2
αj
, D
αj
MaCjt
)
m!
+ 2πλBPrx(Ma)
(MaCN t)
2
αN
αN
NN−1∑
m=0
Γ
(
m+ 2
αN
, D
αN
MaCN t
)
m!
,
where qL = C and qN = 1− C.
The the Laplace transform LIAz (s) can be calculated as
LIAz (s) =exp
(∫ +∞
0
(
e−
s(1−φ)Pt
x − 1
)
Λz(0, dx)
)
=exp
(
−
∫ +∞
0
Λz(0, x)
s (1− φ)Pt
x2
e−
s(1−φ)Pt
x dx
)
(k)
= exp
(
−
∫ +∞
0
Λz
(
0,
1
z
)
s (1− φ)Pte
−s(1−φ)Ptzdz
)
(61)
Step (k) is obtained by the variable replacing z = 1
x
. Following the derivation of the analysis result of
(52) in the proof of Theorem 3, we can derive the analysis result of LIAz (s). Substituting the analysis
result of LIAz (s) into (60), the analysis result of Pr (SINRz ≥ Te|z ∈ ΦZ,L) can be obtained.
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